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Introduction to SCADA Protection and Vulnerabilities
1. ELECTRIC UTILITY AND SCADA/EMS SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
Even though deregulation has changed the landscape of the electric utility industry to some extent,
a typical large electric utility still owns power generation facilities, power transmission and distribution 
lines, and substations. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of these components.
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Figure 1. Utility block diagram.
Transmission and distribution lines form the segments or spokes of a utility’s grid. Power flow may
change through these lines, but control of the system occurs at the nodes of the grid, the generation
facilities, and substations. This section discusses each of these node types in more detail as well as how 
each is controlled. 
1.1 Power Generation
Although power supplying the grid comes from many sources, the majority of power is generated 
by large, investor-owned public utilities. Figure 2 shows the makeup of the types of utilities and the 
amount of power they provide.1
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Figure 2. U.S. power providers.
Fuel for power generation in the U.S. also comes from several sources. The primary source is coal, 
accounting for more than 50% of the total generation. Nuclear power accounts for the next largest portion 
of power produced, at approximately 20%. Natural gas, hydroelectric, and petroleum round out the top 
five energy sources. Other sources, including renewables (wind, solar, geothermal, etc.), account for the 
remaining 2%. Figure 3 depicts these generation sources.1
Coal
52%
Hydroelectric
7%
Gas
16%
Petroleum
3%
Nuclear
20%
Other
2%
Figure 3. U.S. production by energy source – 2000. 
Figure 4 shows a block diagram of a typical electric power plant. From a control standpoint, a large 
plant typically has a local, dedicated control system linked with a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition System (SCADA) Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) via a communications link or by discrete 
inputs and outputs. The SCADA RTU receives status and power flow data from the plant and, depending
on the power plant, may send control signals to increase or decrease power output based on the current 
load on the system and whether import/export of power from the system is required. The generator 
typically has one or more protective relays to prevent damage to the generator or system. Newer
protective relays are microprocessor based, and one relay can incorporate all the functions necessary to 
protect the generator. With older electromechanical relays, several relays are required to perform the same
function.
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Figure 4. Generation plant block diagram.
1.1.1 Coal 
The U.S. has one quarter of the world’s coal reserves, which account for more energy content than 
all of the world’s known oil reserves.2 It is no surprise then, especially considering that most of it is close 
to the surface and easy to mine, that coal supplies more electrical energy than any other power source in 
the U.S. A typical coal-fired power plant has a dedicated process control system to manage fuel feed and 
combustion, emissions, and power output. Little data was found on the manufacturers of control systems
in existing plants, but Bailey (now owned by ABB), Honeywell, and Foxboro are examples of companies
that have traditionally supplied systems of this type.
1.1.2 Nuclear Power
There are currently 104 nuclear power plants in the U.S., 103 of which are operational. As 
mentioned above, these plants account for approximately 20% of the power generation in the U.S., or 
approximately 98,000 MW. All of these plants were built by one of four companies (Combustion
Engineering, Babcock and Wilcox, Westinghouse, or General Electric) and fall into two types:
pressurized water reactors or boiling water reactors. Like coal-fired plants, nuclear plants almost always
have a local process control system for monitoring and controlling the plant. Some of the same companies
that provide control systems for coal-fired plants also supply systems for nuclear power plants.
Commercial nuclear reactors are tightly controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The NRC is responsible for codifying requirements and licensing plants, as well as performing regular 
inspections to ensure compliance with safety and security requirements. Nuclear plants are likely the most
secure of any electric generation facilities. Plants are required to have dedicated security forces, and all 
employees must pass rigorous background checks. 
Nuclear plants must comply with the design basis threat determined by the NRC. The design basis 
threat includes conceivable, credible attacks that could result in the release of radioactive contamination. 
The threat includes attacks by airplanes, trucks loaded with explosives, and many other scenarios. Plant 
security forces often perform force-on-force exercises to prove their resistance to such attacks. 
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1.1.3 Hydroelectric
Hydroelectric power is currently the largest renewable energy resource in the U.S. Much of this 
hydropower is operated and managed by the federal government through the Tennessee Valley Authority,
Bureau of Reclamation, and Bonneville Power Administration. Although the generators and dams that 
make up this system are large, the controls for these systems are relatively simple. Water flow is the main
control variable and this is usually determined by downstream water needs or a certain reservoir level, 
rather than electric power demand. Still, a large hydroelectric plant typically has its own dedicated control 
system. Smaller plants may have only an RTU to control the system.
1.1.4 Gas 
Natural gas is the nation’s fastest growing fuel for consumption and utilization. Gas is used for 
manufacturing, heating, and power production. During the last decade, the demand for natural gas 
increased 19% to levels that are difficult to sustain under current supply and production constraints. This 
demand growth has occurred despite improvements in energy efficiencies during the past several years.
Total natural gas demand is projected to grow 50% during the next 25 years. Natural gas is likely to be a 
primary fuel for distributed power generators – mini-power plants that would be sited close to where the 
electricity is needed.
1.1.5 Petroleum 
Petroleum is used in manufacturing, transportation, heating, and power generation. Only 3% is 
used in power production; the majority is used for transportation. Currently, it supplies more than 40% of 
the total energy demands and more than 99% of the fuel used in automobiles for the U.S.
1.2 Power Substations
There are many similarities between transmission substations and distribution substations, but a 
few differences as well. The following two sections describe their features, similarities, and differences. 
1.2.1 Transmission Substations
Figure 5 shows a diagram of a somewhat typical transmission substation. Major power system
components include circuit breakers, transformers, switches, and, possibly, capacitor banks. Major control
and monitoring components include RTUs and their associated input/output modules, protective relays,
and meters. Newer protective relays and meters are microprocessor-based and are often called intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs).
RTUs interface with input modules to gather status data including circuit breaker open/closed 
status, transformer alarms, protective relay trip status, and other data. RTUs interface with outputs to 
control circuit breakers, switches, and transformer tapchangers. Depending on the size of the system and 
manufacturer, input/ouput modules can either be separate, standalone modules or cards that slide into the
RTU.
Protective relays prevent damage to major equipment in the event of an abnormal condition such as 
a short circuit. These relays monitor each transformer in the substation as well as lines going to other 
substations or generation plants. For lines going to other substations or plants, a relay is required at each 
end, with communication between them so that if there is an abnormal condition, both ends of the line can 
be opened to remove it from service and prevent damage to equipment. Communications channels can be 
via phone line, microwave, fiber optics, pilot wire, power line carrier, or wireless technologies.
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Figure 5. Typical transmission substation.
Newer relays not only communicate with each other, but have communications channels that are 
often tied into the RTU to gather metering data (line voltage, current, and power). They are also often tied 
into an engineering workstation so that engineers can access the relay if it trips a circuit breaker. The 
integration of protective relays into SCADA systems has raised the stakes, somewhat, with regard to 
cybersecurity. While utilities are able to operate their system if the SCADA system is taken out of 
commision, they are much less likely to operate their system without protective relays and risk damage to 
major, long-lead equipment. If an attacker breaks into a SCADA system and trips a breaker via an RTU, it 
can be closed again remotely. However, if an attacker gains access to a protective relay to trip a breaker, 
the relay often triggers a lockout relay that prevents a breaker from being closed again until the lockout is 
reset at the substation.
Meters at the transmission level are used to determine energy flowing into and out of a substation.
This is particularly important when the energy is flowing out of a utility’s system into another utility’s
system or vice-versa. Newer meters are connected to RTUs via a communications link; older meters are 
connected via analog channels. 
1.2.1.1 Distribution Substations. Distribution substations are similar to transmission
substations in that they have circuit breakers and transformers as their primary electrical components.
From a control standpoint, they have RTUs, protective relays, and meters that perform basically the same 
functions as those used in transmission substations. There are a few differences, however. Figure 6 shows 
a typical distribution substation.
A distribution substation typically steps the incoming voltage from transmission levels down to 
medium voltage levels (2,400 to 69,000 volts) for utilization. Since lines at this level typically feed loads 
directly, protective relays typically do not have a communications link to another relay. These relays are 
also more likely to be the older, electromechanical type that do not have communications capability.
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Figure 6. Typical distribution substation.
In recent years, automated meter reading and wireless control of distribution switches have become
cost effective. Many utilities employ one or both of these functions to reduce manpower requirements and 
streamline operations. Automated meter reading gathers billing information via either a wireless or 
power-line-carrier communications link. The information is then uploaded to the utility’s billing center, 
which may or may not be collocated with the control center. Automated pole-top distribution switches are
typically controlled by a substation RTU via a wireless communications link. According to a recent 
survey, the popularity of these switches is increasing.3 The survey shows that respondents had 3,823 of
these switches currently installed, with plans to install 2,272 more. The additional communications
channels provide more pathways for potential attackers to exploit. 
1.2.2 Electric Utility Control Center 
A centralized control and monitoring system is key to the operation and maintenance of a modern
utility’s generation, transmission, and distribution resources, as described in the previous sections. For 
most utilities, this system is housed in one or more control centers. Figure 7 shows a diagram of a control 
center typical of a large utility. For utilities serving many thousands or millions of customers, several of 
these control centers may be used to monitor regional portions of the system. Smaller utilities and rural 
electric cooperatives typically have a subset of the equipment shown in Figure 7. Components of the 
control center include the SCADA system, Energy Management System, and other application servers 
and/or workstations.
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Figure 7. Typical utility control center block diagram.
Figure 8 shows a graphical depiction of a typical control center. A large control center is typically
staffed by several operators, with each operator commonly dedicated to a portion of the system, such as 
transmission, distribution, or generation. The control center is often set up with separate areas for each of 
these functions. 
Figure 8. Typical utility control center. 
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1.2.2.1 SCADA System. SCADA is a term used in several industries fairly generically to refer to 
a centralized control and monitoring system. In the electric utility industry, SCADA usually refers to the 
basic control and monitoring of field devices, including breakers, switches, capacitors, reclosers, and 
transformers. As shown in Figure 7, a SCADA system includes data collection computers at the control 
center and RTUs in the field that can collectively monitor and control anywhere from hundreds to tens of 
thousands of datapoints. It also includes a user interface that is typically monitored around the clock. The 
user interface, in addition to one or more computer displays, usually includes a mapboard or large group
displays to provide an overview of system status.
Also included in the SCADA system are the communications channels required to transmit
information back and forth from the central computer(s) to the RTUs. The physical media used to create 
these channels typically consist of leased lines, dedicated fiber, wireless (licensed microwave or 
unlicensed spread spectrum radio), or satellite links. 
1.2.2.2 Energy Management System. Most utilities have, in addition to a SCADA system, a
computer system that coordinates and optimizes power generation and transmission. The system that 
performs this function is called an Energy Management System (EMS).
As shown in Figure 7, the EMS can include applications such as automatic generation control 
(AGC), load forecasting, engineering load flow, economic dispatch, energy accounting, interchange
transaction, reserve calculations (spin and non-spin), and volts amps reactive (VAR)/voltage control. 
AGC controls generation units in real time to maintain the system frequency at or very near 60 Hz. 
It also balances overall power generation with overall load. AGC is also used to import or export power 
from a utility’s system. Increasing system frequency will cause power to be exported; decreasing 
frequency causes power to be imported.
Load forecasting uses real-time data like outside temperature and historical data to predict the load 
hours or days in advance. Economic dispatch is concerned with determining which generators should be 
operated, based on system load and fuel costs, among other things. Interchange transaction manages the 
import and export of power from a utility’s system. The reserve calculation compares actual generator 
output to rated output in order to determine reserve. The spinning reserve counts only those generators
currently online. The non-spinning reserve includes those generators that are currently offline. 
Figure 9 shows the results of a survey of utilities regarding which EMS applications they currently
use or have plans to use.3
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Figure 9. Current/future plans for EMS applications and functions.
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1.3 SCADA Standards
No single standard covers all SCADA systems and applications. Many additional standards exist 
that discuss specific hardware and software components of SCADA systems, such as communication
hardware, protocols, database compliance, and human machine interfaces. Some standards related to 
SCADA systems are summarized in Tables 1 through 4. 
1.3.1 American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers
Table 1. SCADA-related ANSI/IEEE standards. 
Standard Title Description
ANSI C37.1 IEEE Standard Definition, Specification, and 
Analysis of Systems Used for Supervisory
Control, Data Acquisition, and Automatic Control 
Contains useful definitions and
features for SCADA systems.
IEEE 802.3 Standard for information technology 
Telecommunications and information exchange 
between systems Local and metropolitan area 
networks Specific requirements Part 3: Carrier 
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection
(CSMA/CD) access method and physical layer
specifications
Standard describing 
requirements for twisted pair 
(10Base-T) ethernet
IEEE 999 IEEE Recommended Practice for Master/Remote
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Systems 
Establishes recommended
practices for master station 
equipment communications
protocols to remote equipment 
IEEE 1379 Recommended Practice for Data Communications
between Remote Terminal Units and Intelligent
Electronic Devices in a Substation 
Provides implementation
recommendations for the 
Distributed Network Protocol
(DNP) 3.0 and IEC 60870-5-
101 protocols in substations
IEEE 1402 Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and 
Electronic Security
Provides recommendations 
and survey data for electronic 
and physical security of power
substations
1.3.2 Electronic Industries Alliance/Telecommunications Industry Association
Table 2. SCADA-related Electronic Industries Alliance/Telecommunications Industry Association 
standards.
Standard Title Description
EIA/TIA-232-F Interface between Data Terminal Equipment and 
Data Circuit-Terminating Equipment Employing
Serial Binary Data Interchange 
Contains requirements for serial 
communications standard 
typically referred to as RS-232 
1-9
EIA/TIA-485-A Electrical Characteristics of Generators and
Receivers for Use in Balanced Digital Multipoint 
Systems
Contains requirements for serial 
communications standard 
typically referred to as RS-485 
1.3.3 International Electrotechnical Commission 
Table 3. SCADA-related International Electrotechnical Commission standards. 
Standard Title Description
IEC 60870-5 Telecontrol equipment and systems - Part 5-101:
Transmission protocols 
Describes serial and network 
version of protocol upon which
DNP 3.0 is based 
IEC 60870-6 Telecontrol equipment and systems - Part 6: 
Telecontrol protocols compatible with ISO 
standards and ITU-T recommendations
Describes TASE.2 protocol
typically referred to as 
Intercontrol Center 
Communication Protocol (ICCP)
in U.S. 
IEC 61850 Communication networks and systems in 
substations
Describes protocol similar to 
UCA 2.0. 
1.3.4 North American Electric Reliability Council 
Table 4. SCADA-related North American Electric Reliability Council standards. 
Standard Title Description
Urgent
Action
Standard
1200
Cyber Security Temporary standard relating to 
cyber security for NERC 
members. Applies to computers,
installed software and electronic
data, and communication
networks that support, operate,
or otherwise interact with the 
bulk electric system operations.
This definition currently does 
not include process control 
systems, distributed control 
systems, or electronic relays
installed in generating stations, 
switching stations and 
substations. It does not apply to 
nuclear facilities.
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2. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY AGENCIES AND 
ORGANIZATIONS INFLUENCING THE POWER INDUSTRY 
Several regulatory and non-regulatory agencies, corporations, and institutions control and influence
the generation, transmission, and distribution of power in the U.S. Two of the most visible are the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). 
Other organizations include the Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
Rural Electric Association (REA), Edison Electric Institute, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 
and the Utility Telecommunications Council.
2.1 North American Electric Reliability Council 
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) is a non-profit corporation that is 
primarily concerned with the reliability of electric power in North America. It was organized in 1968 
following blackouts that left nearly 30 million people in the northeastern U.S. without power. NERC’s
members represent all segments of the electric utility industry, from rural electric cooperatives to large 
investor-owned utilities. Federal, state, and Canadian provincial utilities, power marketers, independent 
power producers, and some large-end users are also members. These members account for nearly all of 
the power generation, transmission, and distribution for the U.S, Canada, and portions of Mexico.
Although membership in NERC is technically voluntary, nearly all entities that make up the North 
American grid are members and comply with the policies and standards generated by NERC. 
NERC members are segmented geographically into ten Regional Coordinating Councils, as shown 
in Figure 10. Each of the councils provides input to the development of NERC policies and reliability
criteria and oversees compliance among its members. It also serves as a planning resource for future 
system upgrades. 
ECAR - East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement
ERCOT - Electric Reliability Council of Texas
FRCC - Florida Reliability Coordinating Council
MAAC - Mid-Atlantic Area Council
MAIN - Mid-America Interconnected Network
MAPP - Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
NPCC - Northeast Power Coordinating Council
SERC - Southeastern Electric Reliability Council
SPP - Southwest Power Pool
WECC - Western Electricity Coordinating Council
Figure 10. The 10 Regional Coordinating Councils of NERC.
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NERC has been active in protecting electric utility systems. One of its subcommittees, the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group (CIPAG), is made up of industry experts in cyber, physical, and 
operational security, and works with DOE and the Department of Homeland Security to help ensure the 
security of the nation’s supply of electricity. 
According to Presidential Directive PDD-63, eight critical infrastructures exist in the U.S. Electric
power is one of those eight infrastructures. Per the directive, each critical infrastructure is required to 
operate an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). NERC is responsible for operating the ISAC 
for the electricity sector (ES-ISAC). The ES-ISAC website (www.esisac.com) provides information
regarding current threat levels and incidents as reported by the Department of Homeland Security, tools to 
help in vulnerability assessments, and other information regarding security of electrical systems.4
2.2 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the primary regulatory agency for the 
electric power industry, natural gas industry, oil pipelines, and non-federal hydroelectric projects. 
Along with Congress, FERC has been instrumental in the deregulation of the power industry. Its
landmark Orders 888 and 889, issued in 1996, provided open access to the nation’s transmission grid. 
Order 888 required utilities to publish non-discriminatory tariffs for transmitting, or “wheeling,” power 
over their transmission lines. Order 889 established the Open Access Same-Time Information System
(OASIS). OASIS is a web-based computer system that provides real-time information regarding a 
utility’s available transmission capacity and total transmission capability. These two orders opened the 
way for other utilities, independent power producers, power marketers, and others to purchase and deliver 
power regardless of who owns the transmission resources between buyer and seller. 
Implementation of OASIS has not been uniform. In some cases, utilities have their own OASIS 
site. In the majority of cases, however, multiple utilities share an OASIS site; in several cases, one OASIS 
site serves an entire NERC region. Access to data on OASIS sites is also not uniform. PJM’s OASIS node 
(website https://esuite.pjm.com/mui/index.htm), for instance, requires that a registration form be filled 
out, reviewed, and approved before access is granted. CAISO’s node (website http://oasis.caiso.com), on 
the other hand, provides anyone who visits its website open access to information about existing
conditions, load forecasts, and expected outages. 
Subsequent to the issue of Order 889, FERC encouraged voluntary establishment of independent
system operators (ISOs) among utilities. The primary purpose of creating ISOs was to ensure the non-
discriminatory nature of open access. With an ISO, utilities would retain ownership of transmission
resources but allow the ISO to manage these resources. Since the ISO is a non-profit organization
operated independently of any single utility, it should, in theory, give non-preferential treatment to all 
buyers and sellers. 
FERC, in its Order 2000, further defined the role of the transmission system administrators by 
calling for the creation of regional transmission organizations (RTOs). RTOs are similar to ISOs, but are 
more rigidly defined. Among the requirements for RTOs is that each RTO must have a single OASIS site 
that provides transmission availability for all of its members. Figure 11 shows current RTOs and the 
regions they cover. Note that some RTOs retained “ISO” in their name (e.g., California ISO) but fulfill
the requirements of RTOs and function as such. 
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Figure 11. Current Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). 
2.3 Other Organizations
In addition to FERC and NERC, there are many other organizations involved in various aspects of 
the electric power industry, including federal, state, and industry/other organizations. Following is a list of
these organizations with a brief description of their purpose.1
x Federal
- Department of Energy—provides basic research in energy-related fields, including 
generation, conversion, and emissions; provides basic research in national security; helps 
ensure reliable and affordable sources of energy; promotes renewable energy and 
conservation, helps shape energy policy
- Department of Homeland Security—focuses on reducing terrorist vulnerabilities, preventing 
terrorist attacks, and minimizing damage from terrorist attacks and natural disasters. 
Disseminates information on terrorist threats as well as vulnerabilities
- Environmental Protection Agency—oversees electric power transmission and distribution
with regard to power plant emissions
- National Institute of Standards and Technology—provides research into new security 
devices and methodologies, evaluates commercial security devices, administers the Process 
Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) 
2-3
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission—oversees nuclear power generation, as well as
transportation and production of nuclear fuels 
- Tennessee Valley Authority—America's largest public power company, with generation
facilities that include 11 fossil plants, 29 hydroelectric dams, 3 nuclear plants, a pumped-
storage facility, and 17,000 miles of transmission lines that serve more than 8 million
customers
- Bonneville Power Administration—Federal agency under DOE responsible for operating a 
transmission grid in the Northwestern U.S. and marketing power from 31 federally owned 
dams, one nuclear power plant, and a large wind energy program.
x State
- State Public Utility Commissions—control rate structure for all municipal utilities, investor-
owned utilities, and rural electric cooperatives. 
x Industry/Other
- Electric Power Research Institute—focuses on discovering, developing, and delivering 
technical advances in power technology through partnership with its membership of more
than 700 utilities
- Utility Telecommunications Council—represents telecommunications interests of electric, 
gas, and water utilities before Congress, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
and other agencies
- National Rural Electric Cooperative Association—represents investor-owned electric 
cooperative on issues affecting electric service industry and the environment
- American Public Power Association—represents the interests of approximately 2,000
municipal and other state and locally owned public utilities before Congress, federal 
agencies, and courts. Disseminates information to member utilities 
- Edison Electric Institute—provides information exchange and develops informational
resources and tools. 
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3. METHODS OF SCADA SYSTEM PROTECTION 
Electric utilities use a variety of mechanisms to protect the electric power grid from disruption. The 
most significant measure is a double contingency analysis system, which uses a real-time simulator to 
look for the two worst things that could happen to the grid at any instant and offers operators corrective 
actions to consider and initiate. These “security” systems are powerful; however, the system does not look 
at elements beyond the power grid and is only as accurate as the data received from the field. If the flow 
of this information from the field is cut off, the value of this system is reduced drastically.
Beyond actively monitoring the status of the power grid, most utilities have taken measures to 
guard their control centers and EMS systems from both physical attack and system failure. Practically all 
utilities have established back-up control centers. Some of these centers are collocated; others are in 
separate facilities that include uninterruptible power supplies and backup generators. Other utilities have 
installed completely redundant telecommunications facilities with their own telecommunications control 
center. In most cases, wherever the EMS interfaces with the outside world, utilities have installed dial-
back modems and firewalls. Furthermore, most EMS systems support individual logins and passwords,
and have extensive alarms and event logs. 
Organizationally, all utilities have a robust physical security department, and most utilities have 
some information systems security function to handle the information security requirements for corporate 
systems. The corporate information system security office, in conjunction with the internal auditing 
departments, will generally conduct, or contract for, security evaluations and audits of corporate systems.
But these audits rarely extend into the operational elements of the utility, and few utilities have an 
equivalent information security function for their operational control systems.
In an effort to improve security, utilities reported that they are considering a variety of 
improvements:
x Conducting intensive security evaluations and audits
x Ensuring dial access control (i.e., modem security)
x Using existing security features
x Eliminating security holes
x Evaluating and deploying new security technologies
x Improving coordination between operations staff and corporate information security staff 
x Improving skills of the security staff 
x Establishing security awareness programs. 
However, utility personnel consistently stated that such investments were difficult to sell to senior 
managers, who were often unaware of, or skeptical of, the risks to their information systems. Many
expressed concern that reduced operating margins would further threaten their ability to implement
effective security. Forty percent of the respondents to the EPRI Summer 1996 Electronic Information
Security Survey believed that internal priorities in a competitive environment was the most significant 
obstacle for maintaining a high level of information security.
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Several tools are available to defend systems. These tools include passwords, firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, virtual private networks, and access control. The following sections provide a brief 
description of each of these tools. 
3.1 Passwords 
Passwords can be an effective security method. Two factors that influence their effectiveness are
strong passwords and encryption. Strong passwords are defined as passwords of six characters or more
that do not form a pronounceable word, name, date or acronym, and have at least one special character or 
digit and one mixed-case character.5 Table 5 shows a comparison of the time it takes a password cracking 
program to crack passwords of different lengths for strong passwords (require brute-force cracking) and 
dictionary passwords. Dictionary passwords in this case are based on the 25,143-word UNIX spell-check
dictionary that contains words, numbers, common names, and acronyms. Strong passwords are based on a 
90-character set of letters, numbers, and special characters.5
Table 5. Comparison of times to crack dictionary vs. strong passwords. 
Attack
Number of
Possibilities 2400 bps 9600 bps 19200 bps 38400 bps 10 Mbs
Dictionary Passwords
4 char. 11,022 2.4 hr 1.9 hr 1.4 hr 1.3 hr 0.9 hr 
6 char. 20,721 4.6 hrs 3.5 hr 2.7 hr 2.5 hr 1.7 hr 
8 char. 23,955 5.3 hrs 4.0 hr 3.1 hr 2.9 hr 2.0 hr 
Strong Passwords
4 char. 66,347,190 14,707 hrs 11,168 hr 8,625 hr 7,961 hr 5,528 hr
6 char. 5.3741 x 1011 13,598 yr 10,326 yr 7,975 yr 7,361 yr 5,112 yr
8 char. 4.3530 x 1015 110,150,114 yr 83,647,831 yr 64,599,315 yr 59,630,136 yr 41,409,817 yr
As one can see from the table, strong passwords, especially those of six characters or longer, are 
almost impossible to crack using brute force methods. Of course, if a potential intruder can sniff a 
network and see the password in clear text, the strongest password is no better than a weak password. It is 
therefore important that passwords not be transmitted in clear text. 
Several tools are available for password encryption for workstations and servers. Intelligent devices
in substations, however, often do not support a full character set for passwords, nor do they support 
password encryption.
3.2 Firewalls 
A firewall serves as a barrier to traffic crossing the boundary of a network. Firewalls allow only
packets satisfying predetermined rules to get from outside a network to the inside or vice versa. Firewalls 
can be either standalone devices or software running on a computer. They are often set up with a buffer 
zone, or DMZ, between the protected network and the outside world. The DMZ allows web servers, for 
instance, to provide information to outside customers without having to get through the firewall. 
Standalone firewalls are manufactured by companies like Cisco Systems and Nokia. A simple software
firewall called TinyFirewall is available to run on Microsoft Windows-based machines.
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3.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems are used to detect unauthorized use of a computer network. They can
be set up to detect internal abusers, external abusers, or both. Intrusion detection systems fall into one of
two categories: signature detection systems or anomaly detection systems. Signature detection systems
match packets with known intrusion characteristics and, based on sensitivity settings, determine whether 
an attack is occurring. Anomaly detection compares system behavior with a profile of past behavior to 
determine whether an intrusion is taking place. Both system types require care in setting sensitivity, as 
well as monitoring of event logs. 
3.4 Virtual Private Networks 
Virtual private networks (VPNs) tunnel through open IP-based networks by encrypting data to 
provide a secure connection. VPNs can encrypt just the data packet payload or the whole packet, 
including the source and destination address. In the latter case, a new packet header with a new IP address 
is added. VPN devices, in this case, are matched so that each has a compatible address. Once a packet is 
received by a VPN device, the packet is decrypted and, if the entire packet was encrypted, the dummy
address is stripped off. The packet is then routed to its proper destination. VPNs typically use the triple 
data encryption standard (3DES or triple DES) with 128- to 168-bit encryption. Vendors of these systems
include Cisco Systems, Netgear, and Nokia. 
3.5 Access Control
Access control can include the control of physical access to computer systems. It can also refer to 
electronic access. For electronic access, control measures are identified as one, two, or three factor
authentication. The three factors are: 
1. Something you have (e.g., ID card) 
2. Something you know (e.g., password) 
3. Something you are (e.g., fingerprint).
Obviously, the most secure authentication and access control would incorporate all three, but this is 
seldom the case in actual systems. Two-factor authentication is sometimes used, but single-factor 
authentication is still commonplace for many systems. RSA Security is a leader in two-factor 
authentication systems. According to the RSA website (www.rsasecurity.com), their SecurID cards are 
the most popular two-factor identification system in the world. 
Biometrics is the term typically used to describe the third factor. Several methods are available that 
use biometrics to verify identity. Factors checked by various systems include fingerprints, retinas, iris, 
face patterns, hand geometry, signature, or voice recognition.13 Although costs for these devices is 
decreasing, they do not appear to be used widely. Perhaps one of the reasons is that at least some of them
are quite easy to spoof. According to a recent PC Magazine article, fingerprint scanners could be spoofed 
by simply breathing on the sensor, making the last fingerprint reappear. Some face recognition sensors
could be spoofed by a still photo. Iris sensors could similarly be fooled by placing a photograph of a 
person’s eye on someone else’s face.6 Newer products are addressing some of these problems but current 
biometric devices alone do not provide adequate protection. 
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3.5.1 Actual Usage of Defense Tools 
Respondents to the Computer Security Institute (CSI)/FBI survey report use several tools to defend 
against attacks (see Figure 12). The most commonly used tools are anti-virus software, firewalls, access
control, and physical security. Intrusion detection and encryption are also becoming more common. Most 
of the technologies in Figure 12 were discussed in the previous section or are fairly self-explanatory. One 
technology not discussed earlier but shown in Figure 12 is the PC Memory Card [PC Memory Card 
International Association (PCMCIA)]. The security feature of the PCMCIA card is its removable
function. The card with its stored memory can be removed when not needed, thereby eliminating any
pathway of attack. Reusable passwords, also shown in Figure 12, are static passwords that do not change 
on a regular basis. 
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Figure 12. Security technologies used. 
Information specific to electric utilities indicates that perhaps this industry is falling behind.
According to the Newton-Evans report, use of defense tools among utilities lags well behind industry in
general. Figure 13 shows that most respondents use passwords as a primary means of protection. Only
67% of the respondents use virus protection as compared to 99% in the CSI/FBI study.7 Less than half of 
the respondents use any measure other than passwords and virus protection to defend against attacks. 
3-4
30
33
45
45
47
49
67
89
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Respondents
Multitier Access Level
No Dial in Access
Dial In Security Schemes
Virtual Private Network
Security Coordinated w/IT
Security Switch
Virus Protection
Password Protection
Figure 13. Approach utilization for reducing vulnerability on operational networks in the utility.
A trend that exacerbates the problem for utilities is the increasing use of the Internet for 
applications. Figure 14 shows current and planned implementation of applications using Internet
technology. Notice that expansion in the use of the Internet is being planned for in every category. Of the 
respondents, nearly 40% either currently use the Internet for supervisory control (17%) or plan to do so 
(21%).
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Figure 14. Current/future implementation of functions using Internet technology.
As mentioned previously, NERC has been involved with the security of electric utility systems. Its 
Urgent Action Standard 1200, which was issued in August 2003, is an attempt to standardize and enforce 
compliance with cybersecurity principles. The standard mandates that every entity involved with the 
generation, transmission, or distribution of electric power must perform the following steps: 
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1. Identify its critical cyber assets. 
2. Identify its physical and electronic perimeters.
3. Implement physical and electronic access controls. 
4. Monitor physical and electronic access.
5. Identify response actions for physical and electronic incidents. 
6. Identify recovery plans in the case of an attack. 
Urgent Action Standard 1200 does have limitations, however. It is only effective for one year (can
be extended another year) and does not apply to all utilities or equipment in the grid. NERC is working on 
future standards that will be more encompassing, but approval of Urgent Action Standard 1200 will not 
happen quickly.
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4. VULNERABILITIES
An organization’s systems are most vulnerable at the point where the connectivity is the greatest 
and the access control is the weakest. If someone opted to attack the electric power grid electronically,
rather than physically, he or she would have several options to consider: the control center, the substation, 
and the communications infrastructure. Potential access points include but are not limited to modem
access, network access, wireless network, and power line. The following sections address the nature of 
each vulnerability, any trends affecting the vulnerability, and likely avenues of attack.1
4.1 Control Center Vulnerabilities 
There is no “standard” control center system configuration. Systems range from isolated,
mainframe-based systems developed in-house more than 20 years ago to off-the-shelf, commercially
developed, networked, Unix client/server systems. The industry trend is for utilities to procure “standard” 
vendor system products, based on the distributed client/server technology, in order to reduce schedule risk 
and minimize project costs. They continue to use their private communications networks to support
remote data acquisition, although the use of the public networks is increasing to interconnect corporate 
facilities, neighbor utilities, and the Internet.
An electronic intruder can access the control center through several interfaces:
x Links to the corporate information system
x Links to other utilities or power pools 
x Links to supporting vendors
x Remote maintenance and administration ports. 
The following paragraphs review the details of industry practices for each of these interfaces.
4.1.1 Corporate Management Information System
Although not all utilities have an interface between the control center and the corporate information 
system, the distinct trend within the industry is to link their information systems to access control center 
data necessary for business purposes. One utility interviewed considered the business value of access to 
data within the control center worth the risk of open connections between the control center and the 
corporate network. More common solutions used include firewalls or masked subnet routing schemes to 
create a secure link between the corporate information system and the EMS. 
Current trends towards interconnectivity further increase the chances of an attack through the 
corporate network by providing more access routes. Internet connectivity, modem pools, and individual
modems can all serve as points of access for an electronic intruder into the corporate system and
subsequently into the EMS. Despite the protective measures taken to isolate the control center network,
the control systems are still vulnerable to an attack through the corporate system. Utility operations
personnel interviewed believed that firewalls and dial-back modems were sufficient to protect their
systems from intruders. They were surprised to learn about the experiences of the telecommunications
industry where hackers had defeated these measures.
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4.1.2 Other Utilities and Power Pools 
Many utilities have links between their control room and the control centers of adjacent utilities 
and the regional power pool. Most of these links are one-way connections carrying system data that 
operators use to balance the load on the power grid, schedule transmission, compute economic dispatch, 
and perform security analysis. Application-level controls and proprietary protocols make these links
difficult targets for an electronic attack. 
Several trends within the industry will increase the risk posed by these links. As the industry
migrates to standard protocols, the pool of people with the knowledge to attack the system will grow 
significantly. The flurry of mergers resulting from deregulation of the industry further creates a need for 
merger partners to communicate electronically, increasing exposure. The creation of Independent System
Operators (ISOs) will significantly increase the amount of traffic exchanged between the utilities and their 
ISO. In all likelihood, this traffic will require two-way data flows. Furthermore, the information flowing 
between the organizations (e.g., line capacity and scheduling information) will have significant economic
value and will enable a potential attacker to identify critical nodes in the transmission and distribution
system. Disabling these links would not, however, cause any direct disruption of the power system.
4.1.3 Supporting Vendors
As they move to client-server architectures, utilities are using more commercially developed 
software and are outsourcing the customization and maintenance of EMS and supporting applications. To 
support the installation, debugging, and ongoing maintenance of these new systems, utilities are providing
remote access to manufacturers and integrators. Remote access is generally accomplished through a dial-
in port on the system, although some utilities have dedicated links in place. These remote-access links 
represent a potential point of access for an intruder. A representative of a major EMS manufacturer 
confirmed that all of the company’s products with a dial-in port allow the manufacturer’s engineering
staff to connect to the system to perform software updates and other maintenance functions. These 
products frequently share a simple password that has not been changed in years.
One electric utility reported that an intruder accessed a chemistry monitoring system in its nuclear 
division through a dedicated link between the system and its manufacturer. Once in the chemistry system,
the intruder moved into the utility’s nuclear engineering support network, accessed database entries, and 
altered audit logs to elude detection. Another utility increased access control on a dedicated line to a 
system integrator after it detected intrusion attempts.
4.1.4 Remote Maintenance and Administration 
Many utilities are allowing operations and information systems personnel to access systems
remotely for after-hours support. Generally, this is accomplished by configuring dial-up modems on the 
EMS network. Operations and support personnel can dial into the EMS network through these modem
pools and log in to the EMS system. Once in, they can assist in troubleshooting, perform system
administration functions, and, in some cases, operate EMS applications. 
These dial-in links represent a point of access for electronic intruders. Although some utilities have 
taken measures to limit the operations that can be performed remotely or have further strengthened access
control with token-based authentication systems, other utilities have only minimal protective measures in 
place.
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4.1.5 Impacts 
Regardless of the access point, once in the control system network, the intruder can crash the EMS 
system. A knowledgeable intruder can employ other, more subtle options. For example, a sophisticated 
attacker could corrupt the databases, causing significant economic damage to the utility by disrupting
billing operations. A knowledgeable intruder could issue false commands to the system to open and close 
relays, shutting down lines, and potentially affecting power generation. An extremely knowledgeable
attacker could manipulate the flow of data to the control center, causing the control center operators to 
respond to spurious indications. Fortunately, the technical skills and specific knowledge of an individual
utility’s applications and procedures limit this kind of attack to a very small number of potential attackers. 
Furthermore, though a costly measure to take, most utilities can revert to manual coordination if all 
control center functions are lost. 
4.2 Substation Vulnerabilities
A substation serves as a clearinghouse for power as it transforms high voltages used to transmit the 
power across the service area to lower voltages that are then directed to distribution systems for delivery
to residential and commercial customers. In an effort to provide higher service levels to customers and
reduce staffing requirements, the electric power industry is automating substation operations with remote
terminal units and a variety of intelligent electronic devices. Digital programmable breakers, switches, 
and relays are being produced by several manufacturers, and utilities are now using them in place of 
fixed, or manually set, devices. Both the RTUs and the new automated devices are susceptible to
electronic attack.
4.2.1 Digital Programmable Devices
By dialing into a port on a digital breaker, a utility engineer can reset the device or select any of six 
levels of protection. An electronic intruder, who identifies the telephone line serving such a device, could 
dial into an unprotected port and reset the breaker to a higher level of tolerance. By doing this, it would be
possible to physically destroy a given piece of equipment within a substation. The intruder could also set 
the device to be more sensitive than conditions for normal operations and cause the system to shut down 
for self-protection. Several of the utilities visited did not have any type of security or access control on
these dial-in devices. In either case, utilities reported that such an intrusion, capable of a major impact,
would be indicated by nothing more than an alarm on a control system.
4.2.2 Remote Terminal Units
Besides collecting data for the control center, an RTU operates as a clearinghouse for control 
signals to transmission and distribution equipment. A number of utilities reported having maintenance
ports on substation RTUs that can be remotely accessed through a dial-up modem, some without even 
dial-back protection. An intruder could dial into this port and issue commands to the substation 
equipment or report spurious data back to the control center. Due to the highly networked nature of the 
power grid, knocking out an RTU can have a significant impact on any systems or customers
“downstream” from the substation housing the RTU.
4.3 Communications Vulnerabilities
Utilities rely on a mix of private microwave radio, private fiber, and public networks for 
communications among control system elements. Any one of these mediums could be exploited in an 
electronic attack. In most cases, an attack on the communications infrastructure alone would constitute a 
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nuisance attack. In such an event, most utilities would equip personnel with cellular phones and mobile
radios and dispatch them to key sites to report operating data back to the control center.
However, an attack on the communications infrastructure in conjunction with an attack on the 
electric power control system was characterized by one utility official as a “nightmare scenario.” 
Restoring power would be extremely difficult and dangerous if all means of coordination between the 
control center and generation and transmission elements were lost.
4.3.1 Private Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Microwave systems operating in the 2- and 6-gigahertz range and using aerial or buried fiber optics
make up the majority of utility private communications networks. Utilities view their private 
communications network as a key asset. Several utilities stated that they would rather lose access to the 
public networks than to their private systems. In several cases, utilities sell excess capacity on these
networks to commercial carriers, or plan to use these infrastructures to enter the telecommunications
market.
A utility’s private communications infrastructure is nearly as vulnerable to intrusion and physical
attack as a public network. Utilities reported instances of theft of voice services, as well as the loss of 
voice and data services resulting from physical damage. One utility lost access to most of its private fiber 
network when a truck knocked down a pole at a critical juncture in the system. Microwave 
communications can be intercepted or jammed quite easily. There are multiple sites on the Internet with 
direction for assembling an inexpensive microwave jamming unit. One utility interviewed was 
experiencing severe disruption of its microwave communications system that was finally traced to 
frequency spillover from a cellular service provider. Despite all of this, utilities have stated that their 
private systems are safe and secure because they are isolated from public networks.1
4.3.2 Public Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Roughly one-third of the electric utility control communications traffic is carried on public 
networks. Most utilities use public networks to augment their private networks in the form of redundant 
communications lines to key substations, in geographically remote regions, or in “last mile” situations.
Utilities appear to be aware of the threats to public networks and take risk mitigation measures on critical 
control links, such as requiring diverse routing in leased-line contracts or providing for redundant 
transmission media. Several utilities reported that public network outages had isolated parts of their 
control networks and led them to increase private networking to key facilities. 
It is worth mentioning that the single greatest source of interdependence between the electric power 
infrastructure and the public network is in the use of common rights-of-way. In many cases, public 
carriers lease spare conveyances or share transmission paths with utilities. In such a situation, a physical
attack is more likely to disrupt multiple infrastructures than an electronic attack. 
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5. EXAMPLES OF CYBER ATTACKS 
5.1 SCADA System Attacks
While there isn’t a great deal of anecdotal evidence of SCADA system attacks, there are some
examples. A Schweitzer Engineering Technical Paper, “Concerns About Intrusions into Remotely 
Accessible Substation Controllers and SCADA Systems,”5 gives three examples:
1. Hackers have attacked electric utilities’ business and information systems.
2. In Texas a disgruntled ex-employee posted a note in a hacker journal that he had sufficient
information to electronically attack the power grid. 
3. A radical environmental group was caught trying to hack into a utility’s information system.
Other stories have circulated as well. An oft-quoted example is that of a disgruntled ex-employee
of a SCADA vendor who gained access to one of their customer’s control systems via a wireless link and 
opened valves to dump raw sewage onto the grounds of a Hyatt Regency Hotel. He did this numerous
times and in fact wasn’t caught until the 46th occurrence.8,9
A story about a young teenager gaining access to the Roosevelt Dam’s SCADA System has also
circulated. However, cyber expert Joe Weiss of KEMA Consulting states that this story is a fabrication
and never happened.8,9
The fact that there are not many publicly available examples of SCADA system break-ins does not 
mean they do not happen. The 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey provides an overview 
of the computer security methods used and types of attacks experienced by a cross-section of U.S.
companies.2 While this survey is not focused on the electric utility industry (only 4% of respondents were 
from utilities), it does provide a baseline for the types of attacks perpetrated and the damage done by
unauthorized users. According to the CSI/FBI survey, approximately 56% of respondents reported
unauthorized computer use in the past 12 months, slightly less than the numbers reported in the previous 
4 years. Figure 15 shows the data gathered from 2003.
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Figure 15. Unauthorized use of computer systems within the last 12 months.
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The downward trend in reported attacks could be somewhat misleading. The report also shows an 
increasing trend toward not reporting unauthorized use of computer systems. Respondents cited fear of 
negative publicity or exploitation by competitors as primary reasons for not reporting. Figure 16 shows 
the actions taken by respondents when they were attacked.7
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Figure 16. Response to cyber attacks. 
Although documented evidence of attacks on utility systems is sparse, the threat is real. According 
to security firm Riptech (now owned by Symantec), 70% of their electric utility clients experienced at 
least one major attack in the first half of 2002, compared with 57% in the last half of 2001. Riptech also 
reports that when they try to penetrate a utility’s network, they are successful 95% of the time.10
Types of attacks and/or misuse include viruses, laptop theft, net abuse, system penetration, denial 
of service, and others. Figure 17 shows types of attacks/misuse according to the CSI/FBI survey.2 As one 
can see from the figure, viruses are the most common type of attack. According to the survey, several 
attack types show an increasing trend, including system penetration and denial of service. These two 
attack types, in addition to viruses, typically use the Internet as a source of attack. Indeed, the survey 
found an increasing trend toward Internet-based attacks, compared to inside attacks or remote dial-in (see 
Figure 18).7
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Figure 18. Communications media utilized for attacks. 
Regarding types of attackers, survey respondents, as shown in Figure 19, pointed to independent
hackers and disgruntled employees as the most common.2 Domestic competitors, foreign corporations, 
and foreign governments were also identified as significant sources of attack. Since many attackers are
not caught, it is not clear whether this data is based only on those who are caught or whether these 
numbers are based on conjecture by the respondents. 
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Figure 19. Types of cyber attackers. 
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5.2 General History of Computer Attacks 
Following is a general history of computer milestones, viruses, and attacks as compiled in a recent
Washington Post article.11
1945: Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper discovers a moth trapped between relays in a Navy computer.
She calls it a “bug,” a term used since the late 19th century to refer to problems with electrical devices. 
Murray Hopper also coined the term “debugging” to describe efforts to fix computer problems.
1949: Hungarian scientist John von Neumann (1903-1957) devises the theory of self-replicating
programs, providing the theoretical foundation for computers that hold information in their “memory.”
1960: AT&T introduces its Dataphone, the first commercial modem.
1963: Programmers develop the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII), a simple
computer language that allows machines produced by different manufacturers to exchange data.
1964: AT&T begins monitoring telephone calls to try to discover the identities of “phone freaks,” or 
“phreakers,” who use “blue boxes” as tone generators to make free phone calls. The team's surveillance
chief tells Newsweek magazine in 1975 that the company monitored 33 million toll calls to find
phreakers. AT&T scores 200 convictions by the time the investigation ends in 1970.
1969: Programmers at AT&T's Bell Laboratories develop the UNIX operating system, the first multi-
tasking operating system.
1969: The Advanced Research Projects Agency launches ARPANET, an early network used by
government research groups and universities, and the forerunner of the Internet. 
1972: John Draper, soon to be known as “Captain Crunch,” discovers that the plastic whistle in a box of
breakfast cereal reproduces a 2600-hertz tone. With a blue box, the whistle unlocks AT&T's phone
network, allowing free calls and manipulation of the network. Among other phreakers of the 1970s is 
famous future hacker Kevin Mitnick. 
1972: Future Apple Computer co-founder Steve Wozniak builds his own “blue box.” Wozniak sells the 
device to fellow University of California-Berkeley students. 
1974: Telenet, a commercial version of ARPANET, debuts.
1979: Engineers at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center discover the computer “worm,” a short program that 
scours a network for idle processors. Designed to provide more efficient computer use, the worm is the 
ancestor of modern worms—destructive computer viruses that alter or erase data on computers, often 
leaving files irretrievably corrupted.
1983: The FBI busts the “414s,” a group of young hackers who break into several U.S. government
networks, in some cases using only an Apple II+ computer and a modem.
1983: University of Southern California doctoral candidate Fred Cohen coins the term “computer virus” 
to describe a computer program that can “affect other computer programs by modifying them in such a 
way as to include a (possibly evolved) copy of itself.” Anti-virus makers later capitalize on Cohen's 
research on virus defense techniques. 
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1984: In his novel, “Neuromancer,” author William Gibson popularizes the term “cyberspace,” a word he 
used to describe the network of computers through which the characters in his futuristic novels travel. 
1986: One of the first PC viruses ever created, “The Brain,” is released by programmers in Pakistan. 
1988: Twenty-three-year-old programmer Robert Morris unleashes a worm that invades ARPANET 
computers. The small program disables roughly 6,000 computers on the network by flooding their 
memory banks with copies of itself. Morris confesses to creating the worm out of boredom. He is fined 
$10,000 and sentenced to three years' probation. 
1991: Programmer Philip Zimmerman releases “Pretty Good Privacy” (PGP), a free, powerful data-
encryption tool. The U.S. government begins a three-year criminal investigation on Zimmerman, alleging 
he broke U.S. encryption laws after his program spread rapidly around the globe. The government later 
drops the charges.
1991: Symantec releases the Norton Anti-Virus software. 
1994: Inexperienced e-mail users dutifully forward an e-mail warning people not to open any message
with the phrase “Good Times” in the subject line. The missive, which warns of a virus with the power to 
erase a recipient's hard drive, demonstrates the self-replicating power of e-mail virus hoaxes that continue 
to circulate in different forms today.
1995: Microsoft Corp. releases Windows 95. Anti-virus companies worry that the operating system will 
be resistant to viruses. Later in the year, however, evolved “macro” viruses appear that are able to corrupt 
the new Windows operating system.
1998: Intruders infiltrate and take control of more than 500 military, government, and private sector 
computer systems. The incidents—dubbed “Solar Sunrise” after the well-known vulnerabilities in 
computers run on the Sun Solaris operating system—were thought to have originated from operatives in 
Iraq. Investigators later learn that two California teenagers were behind the attacks. The experience gives 
the Defense Department its first taste of what hostile adversaries with greater skills and resources would 
be able to do to the nation's command and control center, particularly if used in tandem with physical
attacks.
1999: The infamous “Melissa” virus infects thousands of computers with alarming speed, causing an 
estimated $80 million in damage and prompting record sales of anti-virus products. The virus starts a 
program that sends copies of itself to the first 50 names listed in the recipient's Outlook e-mail address 
book. It also infects Microsoft Word documents on the user's hard drive, and mails them out through
Outlook to the same 50 recipients. 
2000: The “I Love You” virus infects millions of computers virtually overnight, using a method similar to 
the Melissa virus. The virus also sends passwords and usernames stored on infected computers back to the 
virus's author. Authorities trace the virus to a young Filipino computer student who goes free because the 
Philippines has no laws against hacking and spreading computer viruses. This spurs the creation of the 
European Union's global Cybercrime Treaty.
2000: Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, Datek, and dozens of other high-profile Web sites are knocked offline for 
up to several hours following a series of so-called “distributed denial-of-service attacks.” Investigators 
later discover that the DDOS attacks—in which a target system is disabled by a flood of traffic from
hundreds of computers simultaneously—were orchestrated when the hackers co-opted powerful
computers at the University of California-Santa Barbara.
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2001: The “Anna Kournikova” virus, promising digital pictures of the young tennis star, mails itself to 
every person listed in the victim's Microsoft Outlook address book. This relatively benign virus frightens 
computer security analysts, who believe it was written using a software “toolkit” that allows even the 
most inexperienced programmer to create a computer virus.
2001: The Code Red worm infects tens of thousands of systems running Microsoft Windows NT and 
Windows 2000 server software, causing an estimated $2 billion in damages. The worm is programmed to 
use the power of all infected machines against the White House Web site at a predetermined date. In an ad 
hoc partnership with virus hunters and technology companies, the White House deciphers the virus's code 
and blocks traffic as the worm begins its attack. 
2001: Debuting just days after the September 11 attacks, the “Nimda” virus infects hundreds of thousands 
of computers around the world. The virus is considered one of the most sophisticated, with up to five 
methods of infecting systems and replicating itself. 
2001: Melissa virus author David L. Smith, 33, is sentenced to 20 months in federal prison. 
2002: The “Klez” worm—a bug that sends copies of itself to all of the e-mail addresses in the victim's 
Microsoft Outlook directory—begins its march across the Web. The worm overwrites files and creates 
hidden copies of the originals. The worm also attempts to disable some common anti-virus products and 
has a payload that fills files with all zeroes. Variants of the Klez worm remain the most active on the 
Internet.
2002: A denial-of-service attack hits all 13 of the “root” servers that provide the primary roadmap for 
almost all Internet communications. Internet users experience no slowdowns or outages because of 
safeguards built into the Internet's architecture. But the attack—called the largest ever—raises questions 
about the security of the core Internet infrastructure.
2003: The “Slammer” worm infects hundreds of thousands of computers in less than three hours. The 
fastest-spreading worm ever wreaks havoc on businesses worldwide, knocking cash machines offline and 
delaying airline flights. 
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